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The cases studies were prepared by John Mihevic, Jamie Swift and Madeline Lunney based on a 
set of questions for the guided interviews developed by CCIC with the input of Learning Circle’s 
participants.  CCIC is grateful to the Canadian Partnership Program of the International 
Development Research Centre (IDRC) for funding all phases of the Learning Circle, including 
the research and production of these case studies.  The case studies were also supported through 
CCIC’s program grant from the Partnership Branch of the Canadian International Development 
Agency (CIDA). 
 
In editing the case studies, the authors worked with members of CCIC Policy Team.  For more 
information on the Learning Circle, please contact Andrea Paula Botto (abotto@ccic.ca) or  
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On November 1999, CCIC launched a Learning Circle on “NGO engagement with the Private 
Sector on an Agenda to End Poverty”. It included two workshops that built on each other and 
some research tasks during the intervening period.  In the context of the learning circle the word 
“engagement” is used to refer to a variety of approaches NGOs are using to influence and 
change corporate behaviour and to promote corporate accountability, from confrontational 
advocacy to dialogue, strategic alliances and program partnership. 
 
During the first workshop participants agreed on the following three forward-looking areas for 
further research: a) the complex relationship of accountability and ownership of strategies; b) 
the inter-play of different NGO’s strategies and point of leverage and c) the impact assessment 
of the strategies used. To nurture Learning Circle’s discussions and learning during the second 
workshop, three preliminary case studies were developed during the intervening period.   
 
The three studies cover different strategies used by NGO when they engage with the private 
sector.  Save the Children and Greenstone is an example of a potential program partnership in 
the extractive sector based in the South (Nicaragua) with Canadian NGO involvement.  The 
object of the collaboration was a community development plan to be funded through CIDA and 
local funds, along with private sector (Greenstone) money.  However, due to financial problems 
Greenstone left the country and the project was never realised.  This case study examines the 
role played by CIDA, and how, under certain circumstances, the different strategies NGOs used 
to engage a company can be counterproductive and undermine their efforts to make the 
company more corporate accountable.    
 
The Ethical Trading Action Group (ETAG) is an example in the apparel industry in Canada of 
advocacy through a partnership of NGOs.  The partnership sought, but up to now has failed to 
realise, a Code of Conduct in the North (in Canada), with implications for Southern groups. This 
case study permits the examination of a campaign, taking place over a short and recent time 
period, and the efforts of a coalition of different groups—churches, labour and development 
groups—to keep various forms of engagement with the apparel sector at the same time.  One 
particularity of this case is the examination of the role of a third party, in this case the Canadian 




Placer Dome in Marinduque (Philippines) is an example of a sequenced advocacy and 
partnership in the extractive sector where the company sought partnership in response to 
advocacy activities from NGOs both from the North and the South.  The research highlights the 
differences that emerge in the engagement strategies of Canadian NGOs towards Placer Dome, 
which became more complicated when the company offered to put funds in place for a 
sustainable development program in Marinduque and to channel these funds through NGOs.  
 
The case studies were developed through both documented research and a series of guided, 
recorded interviews with key informants from the NGO community (both in the North and in the 
South), the corporate sector and third parties, if the latter played an important role in the case. 
For reasons of confidentiality the names of the people interviewed are not included in the 
sources of the case studies. The information obtained was put together in a format that would 
allow Learning Circle participants to foster the discussion and analysis.   
 
Authors of the case studies used different approaches when writing them up. However, all three 
case studies use the following three common sections: 
 
i) A background section that provides a summary of the strategies used by the NGOs involved 
or the identifying milestones in its development; 
 
ii) Perspectives from the different key actors regarding the issues of accountability/ownership, 
synergy of strategies and leverage and the impact of the strategy used; and  
 
iii) A conclusion where the writer provides some reflections or insights on the issues raised 
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In 1995, Toronto-based Greenstone Resources bought the concession rights to 70% of mining 
areas in Nicaragua, including a 5000 sq. km. area of the mining triangle in the North Atlantic 
Autonomous Region (RAAN).  The concession takes in three towns: Siuna, Rosita and 
Bonanza. These towns constitute 38% of the RAAN’s area and 50% of its population. The 
population is multi-ethnic, including the Mayangna indigenous group, as well as Creoles and 
Mestizos. 60% of the region’s population is under 20 years old.  
 
This mining sub-region is rich in forest and mineral resources, with the largest tropical rainforest 
in Central America. However, historically it developed as an enclave community to service the 
mines and currently it is one of the poorest regions of the country, with unemployment at 90%. 
The majority of the population is engaged in subsistence farming, artesanal mining and forestry 
activities. Greenstone invested $80 million in its mining operations in Nicaragua, making it the 
country’s largest investor at the time.  
 
In August 1996, the RAAN was severely affected by Hurricane Cesar. With four other NGOs, 
Save the Children Canada (SCC) - Nicaragua formed a program committee to monitor 
reconstruction efforts and to discuss other possible initiatives for the Atlantic Coast. The 












Reports by environmental groups and in the Nicaraguan press harshly criticised Greenstone 
Resources for polluting the environment with its cyanide-based gold extraction process.  
The Canadian Consul met with Greenstone representatives to propose options for improving 
their image in Nicaragua. Officials from CIDA’s Office of Canadian Co-operation (OCC) 
facilitated meetings between the community and the mining company.  
The company pledged money for a social fund for improvements to the communities. The 
Canadian Consul encouraged Greenstone’s Chairman of the Board to speak with SCC   
representatives in Nicaragua and consider channelling funds through SCC.  
Exploratory meetings between the OCC, Greenstone representatives and SCC led to 
community consultations. SCC proposed that OCC and Greenstone jointly fund a needs 
assessment in the communities of the mining triangle.   
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A needs assessment was conducted through a local NGO. The objective was a community 
development plan that would be funded through CIDA’s children’s fund and local counterpart 
funds, plus money from Greenstone.   
As a result of the needs assessment, SCC developed a proposal designed to promote 
institutional strengthening among area NGOs and local government officials.  
Long-term outcome would be the communities’ autonomy from the mining company, more 





The social fund was on hold because, according to Greenstone, it was not yet making a 





A local environmental NGO, the Humboldt Centre, released the results of soil and water 
samples indicating cyanide and copper concentrations far above acceptable limits at 
Bonanza. It charged Greenstone with contaminating the local environment, putting people 
and livestock at risk, and undermining the local economy.  
Greenstone stock had fallen from a high of $22 in 1996 to around 15 cents. The company 





Greenstone ceased trading on March 13 and closed its Toronto offices shortly thereafter.  
SCC has made use of the original needs assessment in funding proposal for the region. 
 
 
2.0 VIEWS OF PARTICIPANTS 
 
2.1 Type of Engagement/Strategy Used 
 
Save the Children Canada (SCC) looks at the private sector in trying to diversify sources of 
funding and viewed the relationship with Greenstone as an opportunity to access funding for its 
program in Nicaragua. There were many questions because of the nature of mining, but the 
Nicaraguan office was “willing to explore the possibility as long as Save the Children could exert 
a high level of control over that process.” For example, the organization would insist that more 
than half of the funding for an initiative such as the needs assessment come from a source 
other than the company. For Save the Children, the relationship with Greenstone was not so 
much a partnership as an experiment in fund diversification.   
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Investment in infrastructure and community development is required of foreign companies in 
Nicaragua. Greenstone initially felt it lacked the capacity to administer the funds. It became 
evident that a knowledge-based organization like SCC was needed to follow up with ideas for 
projects. SCC in Nicaragua emphasised that the process was designed so that Greenstone 
could not dominate. The model was to “break up the company town mentality” by giving the 
company one vote and one seat at the table, along with community representatives. The 
relationship was promoted by the Office of Canadian Co-operation because of Greenstone’s 
status as a Canadian company and the largest foreign investor in Nicaragua. 
 
Another strategy was “not to enter the process alone”. SCC had been working with its partners 
in the Emergency Program, and later the needs assessment involved 18 local agencies, along 
with municipal representatives, clergy, farmers’ organizations, women’s groups, environmental 
organizations and local activists. Therefore, the organization presented a united force when 
dealing with the company. However, SCC revealed that due to historic mistrust and lack of 
consultation, many community-based NGOs were reluctant to advertise to their constituents that 
they were collaborating with Greenstone.  
 
SCC in Nicaragua worked on the assumption that “international co-operation is changing . . . the 
money is not flowing in ... we need to open ourselves up to experimenting, but none of our 
counterparts could do it openly. A Nicaraguan organization would have exposed itself to pretty 
severe criticism.” The organization used the committee as a sounding board once it had 
established that the community wanted to move forward. Increasingly the committee consisted 
of local people, rather than the Managua-based NGOs. Along the way a few groups withdrew 
from the committee and took a more critical position with the mining company. They were more 
openly critical of Greenstone, but did not engage the company.  
 
SCC staff explained that they “took their time” in approaching the partnership with Greenstone. 
Partnership with a mining company was a delicate matter, given the history of conflicts and the 
environmental degradation left in the wake of previous mining operations. For SCC, the purpose 
of the needs analysis was to “buy time” and look at the way that Greenstone conducted itself. 
 
The relationship was characterised by a report from the OCC, which initiated the contact, as one 
of “comparative advantages to fulfill mutual interests.” SCC presented proposals to various 
funders. Its work in the community was not limited to the relationship with Greenstone. 
However, the OCC said, the relationship was a way to maximise resources. According to OCC 
officials, the relationship was beneficial for their office as well because it meant they would be 
less isolated, more aware of what was going on at the community level.   
 
There were a number of difficult moments in the relationship, SCC staff revealed. Early on, it 
was clear that the company was not going to make a lot of money at the mine. Because there 
were financial problems at Greenstone, the second wave of managers was more interested in 
“giving out baseball caps than in pursuing the areas identified in the needs assessment.” They 
went on to make other contacts at the Ministry level and they stopped seeing SCC as 
instrumental in delivering community programs. They created their own interventions based on 
“successful models” that had worked in Venezuela. It had always been difficult to establish a 
direct line of accountability with the mine managers, but now the company said it had no funds 
and no time to invest in the community relationships. SCC decided it was no longer worth 
pursuing the process and the committee was dissolved.  
 
  
CCIC Learning Circle – June 2000 3 
Save the Children-Canada and Greenstone Resources in Nicaragua Case Study 
 
 
SCC explained: “[Greenstone’s] interest was more in getting good publicity because they were 
under attack due to environmental concerns. Since [Save the Children] wasn’t interested in 
playing the role of supporting Greenstone publicly or being vocal about our involvement . . . we 
weren’t going to speak in the press about Greenstone when they hadn’t really done anything 
yet… weren’t going to defend them against the environmental groups that were criticising them.” 
 
For the former Chair of the Greenstone Board, the relationship was initiated because of his 
personal interest in Save the Children. The company’s officers sought to improve relations with 
the community, believing that this was in their best interest. He commented on the “desperately 
poor conditions” in Bonanza and said that, in his opinion, organizations should concentrate their 
efforts on children. He acknowledged that there had been no mechanism in place to 
institutionalise the relationship between Greenstone and SCC. Therefore, when a change in 
personnel took place, SCC was in the unfortunate position of having to sensitise company 
executives all over again. 
 
Regarding alternative strategies, another SCC staff member explained that “As an organization 
we have not done a deep analysis of our engagement [with the private sector].” In Peru, the 
organization is looking at the difference between fund raising and program development, the 
latter allows for private sector investment for mutual benefit.  In Peru they have created Save 
the Children Inc., which will provide services, possibly to the mining sector. She explained that 
“[Save the Children works] to be able to offer the private sector the opportunity to invest in good 
programs, but we have not yet developed a written strategy on the criteria for engagement… If it 
can benefit children and we can do something positive, we are willing to explore it.” 
 
A representative from the company stated that he believes “companies from a first world country 
should reach out beyond immediate operations and do something in the community” when 
operating in developing countries. For him, it was “conceptually helpful” to be able to link up with 
a Canadian NGO. Unfortunately, he commented, they “were overtaken by events”. While “it was 
clear that the company did not work as hard as [it] might have done on the public relations side”, 
it could have been a useful partnership for all involved had the company not run into financial 
difficulties. He remains convinced that “while a private company can’t take over the social 
responsibility of government, it should help local governments” and contribute, where possible, 
to alleviating poverty, especially among children.  
 
For Southern representatives, the critical issue was to represent the interests of their 
constituents, which ranged from exploring the possibilities for funding small projects to 
forwarding specific agendas, as was the case for the small miners’ union. The miners’ union 
viewed the consultations as an opportunity “to benefit from the knowledge of other 
organizations.” Regarding engagement with the company, they were sceptical, doubted that the 
company was sincere and concerned that they “didn’t know everything about the company.” 
 
For representatives of the Ministry of Health, the community consultations provided an 
opportunity to make people aware of health issues and the extent to which these are common 
throughout the region. One community member stated that she “wouldn’t be against working 
with private enterprise. [The Ministry of Health’s] mandate is to address health issues. But it’s 
really the responsibility of everyone: individuals, families, all of the State organizations, as well 
as the private sector. We have to manage information and participate in finding solutions.” 
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Community representatives were well aware that the company sought to improve its public 
image. Most people felt that the end result of Greenstone’s contribution had been positive, but 
very small compared with what was promised and what was needed. Some Southern 
informants spoke of concrete improvements in the community and almost all were very positive 
about the capacity building workshops. One local official reported that he appreciated being 
given time to consult with the communities, and spoke of the benefits of capacity building for his 
staff.  
 
Another community leader commented on the scale of collaboration among the various 
organizations and municipal governments: “We were putting together projects for the integral 
development of the community but we didn’t have the support necessary. There are some 
NGOs who have abandoned their work and left the area.” He spoke of the frustration felt by 
community members after investing six months of work in the community consultations, only to 
find that Greenstone had withdrawn its support.  
 
For an informant who used to work with the Ministry of the Family in Rosita, the process 
became a locus of community organizing for women, who were empowered to elaborate and 
present their own projects. Through participation in the consultative needs assessment, 
communities were encouraged to conceptualise and discuss shared concerns. She saw the 
process as a good beginning, but stated that the problem was lack of sufficient resources to 
meet community needs. She insisted that there needs to be more investment in the RAAN and 
that all kinds of organizations and private companies would be welcome to consult with the 
community on possible projects for mutual benefit. 
 
SCC representatives stated that they had been able to build relationships with community 
organizations. They believe it is important to try to experiment. The process strengthened Save 
the Children’s presence in the area. In the end, Greenstone contributed very little money to the 
community, but it did fund the needs analysis and a portion of the capacity building workshops. 
Ultimately as a result of proposals based on the needs analysis, SCC now has a program 
budget of $US1.2 million that it “wouldn’t otherwise have.” These funds are being used at the 
community level to address needs identified in the original community consultations.   
 
 
2.2 Complex Relations of Accountability and Ownership of Strategy 
 
Generally, Southern informants agreed that community members had a voice in deciding 
priorities to be discussed within the needs assessment and town hall discussions. However, this 
was more apparent vis-à-vis SCC. One Southern community leader stated that there had been 
no relationship with the company. Another expressed dismay that Greenstone had not been 
“more honest about its expectations.” 
 
Another civil society representative referred to the process as being akin to venturing down a 
road without knowing one’s destination. He charged that the communities were not adequately 
informed of Greenstone’s problems and were therefore unprepared when the process was cut 
off and the funds were not forthcoming. He stated that SCC could have communicated more 
effectively and “should have been more open about the process.” “The communities did not 
receive the support necessary to continue the process of organizing and planning that was set 
in motion by the consultations. There were many projects that were never approved. In this 
respect the objectives were never clear and were set by other actors.” 
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In order to ensure accountability toward the affected communities, the needs assessment was 
carried out by a local NGO and government agencies and civil society groups were invited to 
take part. SCC emphasised that every decision was made with the participation of the 
community. SCC had a “foot in the door” with the NGOs, which had a history in the region and 
could trade on that trust built up with the community. None of the Southern representatives 
believed that their organizations had to make compromises or surrender autonomy in order to 
participate in the process. 
 
SCC felt it had exercised transparency in its dealings with the company on behalf of the 
community partners. SCC staff also spoke of efforts to keep other NGOs working in the area 
informed of their activities.  
 
Later, SCC felt that some Canadian NGOs, reacting to misinformation about the nature and 
level of Greenstone’s participation in the community processes, had failed to support the 
initiative in the mining triangle. It was felt that there was little support for experimentation in 
terms of engaging the private sector. Engaging with a mining company was very controversial 
and, rather than contacting SCC, other organizations were quick to criticise.  
 
SCC believed it was able to avoid being manipulated and constantly monitored the company’s 
financial situation. There was a coincidence of interests and strategies with the first group of 
people. That coincidence was not there with the new group of officers. The flow of information 
was cut off along with the funding.  
 
A Former Chief Operating Officer stated that the Greenstone considered itself accountable to 
the Nicaraguan government as well as to Canadian investors. When Greenstone went into a 
community it assessed what had to be done “on the social side”. The company “wanted to show 
social responsibility” and that “it was easier to deal with an NGO than work through the 
government.” The funds for community work usually came from Greenstone’s profits, but the 
company never made a profit in Bonanza, he said.  
 
Because Bonanza was a large region and the need was so great, the company made use of 
SCC’s expertise to identify how to work there. He explained that “typically in remote locations 
with finite populations it’s important to get involved.” In the past, the company “picked up the tab 
for everything,” concentrating on health and nutrition issues for mine workers and their families.  
Historically the mining companies located their operations away from settlements and basically 
built the community. The people living in the communities were people the mining company 
brought in. The population growth in places like Bonanza “has an impact on services” and 
necessitates a change in strategy to ensure that employees are productive.  
 
Greenstone saw SCC as an initial interlocutor. In response to the question about whether 
Greenstone had met its objectives for the partnership, the company representative stated that 
“there had been some positive outcomes” and that staff of the current mining operation in the 
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2.3 Synergy of Strategies and Points of Leverage 
 
SCC had 18 years of experience in Nicaragua and was aware of the unique issues confronted 
in the Autonomous Regions. SCC staff believed they had good relationships with other 
Canadian organizations in the region and local NGOs, and were aware of these organizations’ 
mandates and activities.  
 
SCC said it attempted to engage other NGOs working in Nicaragua. There was a lot of 
divergence of views among Canadian NGOs.  A SCC informant commented that sometimes 
“Canadian NGOs take away the community’s voice because we have our own perspective on 
how things work but we fail to see that people’s main concern is survival and if they think that 
something positive can come out of a relationship with a mining company, despite the fact that 
they know that mining companies do all kinds of negative things, they’re willing to sit at the table 
and see whether they can negotiate.” 
 
SCC acknowledges the need to address macro-economic and political issues in terms of 
addressing poverty and does advocacy on specific issues. SCC is moving toward defining its 
role in advocacy.  
 
A SCC informant commented that “working with resource companies is very difficult because of 
the nature of what they do.  Having said that, NGOs have to diversify their funding sources. We 
need to develop criteria around how to engage with the private sector . . . If we feel that a 
company is really committed to negotiating fairly and is willing to legitimately reflect our values, 
we’re very open to sitting down with them.” But this thinking hasn’t yet been captured on paper.  
 
During the time that SCC pursued its relationship with Greenstone, the miners’ union was also 
negotiating with the company for the right to prospect for ore on Greenstone’s concessions. The 
artesenal miners had previously been allowed to mine on the periphery of the concession. 
Greenstone prevented them from starting their own union and limited their access to the ore.  
 
An environmental organization in Nicaragua continues to monitor the water and soil quality in 
mining areas and to lobby the national government against more permissive mining legislation 
that would give the government unprecedented powers to grant concessions at the expense of 
local governments and autonomous communities. Representatives of the organization 
participated in some of the community consultations with Greenstone.  
 
Their perspective is that an organization such as SCC that is known for promoting “human rights 
and children’s development” should not have accepted funds from Greenstone. An activist with 
the Centre saw the relationship as a way to promote the company. In her opinion the national 
government should have acted as the mediator in the conflict between Greenstone and the 
community. Here she referred to the miners’ negotiations and the charges of environmental 
contamination that has polluted water and soil, and threatens the health of community members 
and livestock.  
 
The organization is lobbying to get the national government to accept responsibility for the 
social and economic development of the zone and some community members saw the project 
with SCC and Greenstone as interfering with this work. However, the former mayor of Bonanza,  
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now working at the environmental organization, said that under the right conditions it might be 
possible to effectively dialogue with the mining company. He spoke of support for the 
community consultation process in principle.  
 
 
2.4 Impact Assessment and Monitoring 
 
The answer to who benefited most in the relationship differed among informants. Overall, it was 
agreed that there had been positive impacts, although Southern representatives were 
disappointed that some of the benefits hoped for never materialised.  
 
Representatives of Southern organizations were generally pleased with the capacity building 
process, but a few local officials commented that there had been insufficient support for taking 
the initiative further. The needs are great, they explained, and the community had an 
expectation that more projects would be funded.  One local official said he believed there should 
have been written commitments at the outset and suggested that the coalition had been 
unsuccessful in pressing for more project funding because there had not been a lead 
organization at the local level.  
 
One health professional praised the focus on the participation of civil society in proposing 
solutions to collective problems and said that the benefits were most evident at the level of the 
participating community groups.  
 
Whether because Greenstone didn’t “do enough promotion of its efforts” on behalf of the 
community, as stated by a company representative, or whether the company’s problems simply 
outweighed any positive actions, no one interviewed believed the relationship between SCC and 
Greenstone had significantly strengthened its global corporate position.  
 
When asked whether things had changed for mining companies a former Greenstone official 
said “the pressure causes you to think more about your actions” and noted that the pressure 
came “more from the outside than from inside the country.” As to whether the partnership with 
SCC had changed his own outlook on social responsibility, he stated that he believed it was 
important for companies to assess the needs of the community and that, depending on the size 
of the community, he would be willing to recommend partnering with an NGO again in the 
future.  
 
One civil society representative expressed frustration over the SCC-Greenstone relationship 
and suggested that the time and resources devoted to developing this were wasted. 
 
SCC “didn’t get a lot of money, but did what [it] wanted to do anyway.” And “felt it was a win-win 
situation” because the organization was able to proceed with the needs assessment. “In the 
traditional mining company model,” explained SCC, “their idea of social programs would be 
baseball caps, sewing machines. But our idea was to get to know the people through the needs 
assessment.” The organization effectively used the process to build relationships with local 
municipal governments. It is now working more with numerous community groups in the RAAN. 
SCC stated cautiously that it would pursue the relationship again, despite the difficulties. There 
were few trade-offs and it is important to innovate and diversify in order to better serve the 
community.   
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Some community representatives were willing to consider working with the private sector “if the 
company is sincere in wanting to assist the community.” To that end community groups could 
buy some time working with SCC and observing the process of engaging with Greenstone. 
However, as this process was cut short, the lessons learned in terms of private sector 
partnerships were never fully developed.  
 
It seems clear that some representatives of civil society wanted to dialogue with the mining 
companies in order to explore partnerships, access funds and make demands on behalf of their 
constituents. One representative commented that “this was democracy in action.” Therefore, 
SCC saw themselves as acting on this imperative from the community and believed that they 
would be able to maintain transparency and some distance in terms of allying themselves with 
Greenstone. Nevertheless, it is clear that not all community members were willing to dialogue 
with the company. How does an NGO in this situation serve the community without alienating 
other activist/pressure/lobby groups? 
 
Clearly it made sense to include local organizations and municipal officials in the committee 
discussions and needs assessment. But it appears that some stakeholders had unmet 
expectations about their roles, or the roles of their organizations, in the projects that would have 
been generated if the funding from Greenstone had been received. Whether this was true at the 
time, or reflects changing perceptions over the last few years, is not certain. It seems that some 
community organizations associated SCC very closely with the company in terms of the failure 
to secure funds for the projects proposed after the capacity building workshops.   
 
In its 1998 Annual Report, Greenstone stated that it believes that building relationships with 
communities in the mining areas is good business. In NGO-type language laced with 
paternalism, it boasted: “Our approach is to partner with the community on social programs that 
improve the quality of life. Providing communities with direct partnership in decision-making 
ensures that real needs are met and that local organizations learn to take responsibility for their 
own development issues.” Community members countered that the social programs included 
road repairs the company made for its vehicles, newsletters, “silly things” like baseball caps and 
company newsletters, and planting trees with no economic value.   
 
In a 1999 article in America’s Update, Carolyn Bassett observed that “there are two key 
problems associated with Greenstone’s approach to environmental responsibility. The first is 
that aid projects that restore some small portion of the ecological balance in a region where 
community health has been severely eroded by mining and logging are no substitute for strictly 
adhering to appropriate regulations in the first place. The second is that the aid projects have 
not been based on sufficient consultation to determine the needs and preferences of the local 
communities.” 
 
Save the Children had sought to counter this lack of consultation. However, soliciting funds from 
a company like Greenstone raises a variety of difficult questions and contradictions. The 
obvious concerns are doing the company’s public relations work, lending it greater legitimacy in 
the community, being co-opted or interfering with the activities of other organizations. At a 
fundamental level, there is the question of whether to engage the private sector to “partner” in 
community development at all. SCC stated that it would likely have done the needs assessment 
without Greenstone’s support. 
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A SCC staff member commented that she used to tell Greenstone that “if it raised salaries the 
company could do more in terms of the development of the community than with investing the 
same amount of money in a community program . . . Maybe the private sector wouldn’t need 
NGOs as much if they were more fair in their labour practices.”  
 
The question of who monitors the company’s activities is key. SCC stated that it participated in 
the partnership because it was confident that the communities’ needs were being addressed. 
The mining practices of Greenstone were not discussed in the context of the community 
meetings because it was expected that the company was operating according to national and 
international standards.  However, a consultant’s report for the Office of Canadian Co-operation 
declares that through the trilateral project “Canadian mining corporations have learned how to 
implement more modern, humane and environmentally friendly mining practices which take 
local populations into consideration.” In fact, the company’s mining practices were never part of 
the equation.  
 
Although an informant at the OCC asserted that mining companies (like Triton, for example) 
now go above and beyond what is required by law, it is obvious that Greenstone believed its 
obligation was only to the minimum standards, and at times its activities fell short of those. 
Environmental groups in Nicaragua, supported by groups in Canada, want to force Greenstone 
to compensate the RAAN communities for environmental damage that has polluted water and 
soil in the area around the mines, and put the health of people and their livestock at risk. But 
now that the company has ceased operations in Nicaragua and Canada, where do they go to 
demand this compensation?  
 
There are contradictions and dilemmas for all the actors involved. A number of these were 
raised during interviews: SCC pointed out that local people were not involved in the 
environmental campaigns against Greenstone. Campesinos from other countries were invited to 
the mine. How do the environmental groups conduct campaigns without alienating those who 
depend on resource extraction for their livelihood? For local officials, the mining sector is 
problematic because it is one of few sources of income in a very poor area. Demanding the 
closure of the mines could be an unpopular stance. Municipal officials spoke of efforts to 
enforce the region’s autonomy and control over resource concessions and the fact that the 
money Greenstone paid in taxes, a portion of which should have gone to the municipalities in 
the RAAN, was distributed at the discretion of the national government. How can the 
communities effectively lobby the government for their share of these funds while pressuring 
foreign companies to invest further at the local level? 
 
Local critics argue that foreign companies easily co-opt or control officials from the Ministry of 
Natural Resources, whose trips to the coast were often financed by the mining companies. 
Government officials have no resources and laws are not enforced. Operating in the 
Autonomous Region of Nicaragua should have meant that Greenstone was answerable to the 
indigenous communities. However, Save the Children, the municipalities and other actors 
accepted it as a legitimate presence in the mining triangle.   
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SCC did not have high expectations of Greenstone because early on company officials stated 
they didn’t have enough money. However, community members had higher expectations 
because of the apparent wealth of the company (In Bonanza, the foreigner managers lived on a 
hill above the town, with electricity and running water  - in scarce supply in the town - and rarely 
interacted with the local community.), the consultative process undertaken and, perhaps, the 
participation of the Office of Canadian Co-operation.  
 
A SCC staff member in Nicaragua mentioned that she is now more sceptical about private 
sector partnerships, but continues to be open to the directions of the community. SCC did an 
evaluation of the relationship with Greenstone along with community partners in Siuna. People 
are deciding whether they will approach the new owners of the mine there, who are Nicaraguan. 
The consultant who carried out the needs assessment is adamant that civil society is growing in 
strength and capacity in the region and that the fact that there are so many actors with different 
perspectives on the Greenstone experience illustrates this. 
 
It was generally felt among those interviewed that the majority of corporations probably wouldn’t 
change their activities to be more in sync with the agenda for corporate social responsibility. 
One informant stated: “My expectations are as minor as ever . . . NGOs are starting to talk a 
little bit like the private sector, but the differences are still significant. . Making money for your 
stockholders is still the bottom line.”  
 
However, if there existed the possibility that the company could be pressured into making a 
commitment to the development of the zone, the idea was that the local organizations should 
have the opportunity to negotiate. Given these groups’ orientation to the needs of their 
members, this could have contributed to the agenda to end poverty. The community was clearly 
interested, but a genuine opportunity to pressure the company to change its operating principles 
and values never materialised.  
 
One of the Southern informants summed up the problem with “How do we change the paradigm 
that those who invest capital are the only ones who benefit?” 
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Interviews Were Conducted With: 
 
Two former officers of Greenstone Resources 
Staff of Save the Children in Nicaragua and Canada 
Staff at CIDA’s Office of Canadian Co-operation in Nicaragua 
Current Consul (Office of the Canadian Embassy) for Nicaragua 
Representatives from an environmental NGO operating in the mining triangle 
The consultant who co-ordinated the needs assessment with a local NGO 
Five community representatives who participated in the  
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"The tension that has always prevailed within capitalism between 
monopoly and competition, between centralization and decentralization of 
economic power, is being worked out in fundamentally new ways capitalism is 
becoming every more tightly organized through dispersal, geographical mobility 
and flexible responses in labour markets, labour processes, and consumer 
markets, all accompanied by hefty doses of institutional, product and 
technological innovation." 
 







1.0 The ETAG Initiative:  Review of History and Strategy 
 
The Ethical Trading Action Group (ETAG) has been an effort by Canadian NGOs to promote fair 
and ethical employment practices in the South. The NGO strategy has involved advocacy and 
dialogue, focusing on Canadian-based retailers, contractors and sub-contractors in the apparel 
and footwear sector and related consumer products industries. The immediate goal has been 
the negotiation of a Canadian base code of labour practice for these industries. 
 
ETAG emerged from the efforts by Canadian NGOs to promote economic justice in a labour 
intensive industry undergoing significant locational shift. These changes reflect broader changes 
in the geography of global production. This effort brought together a coalition of development, 
labour, religious and community organizations around the issue of sweatshop working 
conditions both at home and abroad.  
 
The coalition took shape before negotiations over a code of labour practice began and remain 
intact even though these negotiations broke down in the spring of 2000. It undertook its 
activities against a broader international background, with Northern and Southern activists 
advocating a fairer, more ethical system of international trade. This campaign has been 
accompanied by a struggle with the meaning – and application – of the various codes that would 
provide a way to assess whether particular corporate practices are, indeed, fair and ethical.  
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support for worker organizing in the South and the North through a Canadian campaign 
aimed at raising the profile of sweatshop labour 
pressuring retailers and manufacturers to respect worker rights in the South and to agree on 
minimum labour standards there 
mobilisation of citizen-consumers in the North to advocate worker rights both South and 
North by broadening the coalition of Canadian organizations active on issues of ethical 
trading and corporate accountability 
networking with Southern groups, sharing information and analysis on code initiatives 
ensuring that Canadian activity has meshed as smoothly as possible with Southern 
advocacy and organizational work  around issues of labour rights and just working 
conditions  
pressing Canadian governments for proactive policy and legislative approaches that would 






ETAG's work has its roots in the recognition by Canadian NGO activists of what has been called 
the "Global South," specifically that sweated labour was not confined to offshore free trade 
zones and maquiladoras. Campaigning for fair wages and working conditions for home workers 
and contract shop workers in Canada has strengthened links with Canadian trade unions. This 
alliance was part of broader connections between Canadian groups concerned with social 
justice internationally and the country's labour movement. These links (both institutional and 
personal) matured gradually over the course of at least two decades of liberation support and 
solidarity work. They are tighter than those in the United States, where the mainstream of the 
labour movement was emerging more slowly from the Cold War chill that often tainted its 
overseas relationships, particularly with its Latin American counterparts. 
 
By the mid-nineties concern over sweatshop conditions in the South had resulted in specific 
campaigns focusing on high profile brands and retailers. The Canadian Catholic Organization 
for Development and Peace co-ordinated a campaign around Nike that was subsequently co-
ordinated by the Maquila Solidarity Network. The MSN, together with the Union of Needletrades, 
Industrial and Textile Workers (UNITE) focused on the GAP. Both firms are instantly 
recognisable to the mass of consumers. Both typified capital's shift to flexible accumulation – 
corporations have moved away from direct control of production, concerning themselves with 
"sourcing" production of physical goods (in this case shoes and apparel) from outside 
contractors while concentrating on the production of images and instant recognition. 
 
The Toronto-based Labour Behind the Label Coalition took shape in 1996. It included 
development, religious, community and labour organizations, many of them national. The 
Coalition's work on domestic sweatshop issues has included a Wear Fair Charter for fair 
treatment of garment workers, publicity (including sweatshop fashion shows) exposing unfair 
labour practices, as well as campaigning against intransigent companies while dialoguing with 
those that respond positively to Coalition initiatives.  
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In October 1997, the Coalition joined with a wider group of labour, religious and citizen 
organizations, starting a Citizen's Petition that called on the federal government to launch a 
national task force on sweatshop abuses. The proposed task force would have included 
retailers and manufacturers as well as Canadians concerned about how their clothes were 
produced. Within eight months the petition had gathered some 30,000 signatures and the 
support of 200 organizations. Several major retailers, threatened by shareholders actions from 
the British Columbia Federation of Labour, agreed to support the task force. In June 1998 the 
retailers' umbrella group, The Retail Council of Canada (RCC), also lent its support to the task 
force proposal. The inter-church group Ten Days for Global Justice conducted a postcard 
campaign in support of the task force. 
 
This process was accompanied by a series of meetings (later named the Ethical Trading 
Forums) facilitated by the Maquila Solidarity Network (MSN), a key organization in the Labour 
Behind the Label coalition. These discussions gave rise to a multi-sector steering committee, 
the Ethical Trading Action Group. ETAG included some of the original supporters of the 
sweatshop initiative as well as the Canadian Council for International Co-operation, the 
Steelworkers Humanity Fund and the Canadian Labour Congress. MSN acted as secretariat for 
both ETAG and the Labour Behind the Label coalition. 
 
By the spring of 1999 the federal government, unwilling to launch a task force, agreed to appoint 
former MP John English to facilitate meetings between the sweatshop coalition and industry. 
The first of these took place in May, at which time a joint industry/civil society-working group 
was mandated to develop a code of labour practice. The group included the Steelworkers 
Humanity Fund, UNITE and the MSN together with the Retail Council and the apparel and shoe 
manufacturers associations. As 1999 drew to a close, the negotiations were foundering on 
whether freedom of association should be in the code and whether the code should be based 
on ILO core labour rights conventions. ETAG began a letter writing and media campaign aimed 
at persuading two leading retailers (Sears and the Hudson's Bay Company) to get involved 
directly. Although the two firms did subsequently participate in joint meetings, the negotiations 
broke down permanently, with the Retail Council saying that it intended to adopt its own code. 
Again, the sticking point was language respecting the right to organize and bargain collectively 
(the ETAG position) versus the lawful rights of free association (the RCC position). 
 
Throughout the process the NGOs involved were able to continue their traditional advocacy 
work while engaging businesses in direct dialogue over the issues that concerned them. 
 
 
1.2 Effectiveness of Strategy 
 
The effectiveness of the ETAG strategy can only be judged from a long-term perspective. 
Evaluating it depends on a corresponding evaluation of other factors, including, the changing 
structure of Canadian retailing and manufacturing; the laissez-faire stance of the Canadian 
state; the shifting strategies capital has adopted to the control of labour and labour markets; and 
the ways that Canadian activists have appreciated the importance of everything from Southern 
organizing to the corporate colonisation of public and private space at home. An overarching 
concern has been the extent to which the Canadian NGO engagement with the corporate sector 
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2.0  The Views of the Participants in the ETAG Process 
 
In spite of the lack of success of negotiations over a Canadian base code of labour practice, 
none of the participants indicated that the process of government-mediated engagement 
between NGOs and the private sector was a waste of time. Instead, all informants agreed, to 
varying degrees, that engagement through dialogue had been useful, albeit for different 
reasons. 
 
One industry participant had predicted the eventual outcome from the start. The reality was that 
the Retail Council could only go so far "and still have a hope of involving a large number 
retailers in getting a code approved." And this would, predictably, not be "satisfactory to the 
union groups." Still, this participant felt that the process was a "constructive step as far as it's 
gone" because a lot of issues were raised and discussed fairly thoroughly. "People know what 
the questions are." 
 
Another person from the same side of the table hoped communications remain open and that 
some sort of process continues. One of the positive things to emerge was information sharing 
and "the understanding from both sides of what the challenges are. That is very important." 
 
From the other side, an NGO participant reported that you have to take a long view. "We're still 
at the very early stages of trying to get the companies do anything any differently." Although this 
person's first response was to consider the process fruitless, "If you look back over a ten year 
period you have made some gains in terms of what the corporate sector thinks it has to take into 
account." This respondent suggested that it is important to recognise the internal dynamics 
within some firms, where individual managers can gain space: "There are some companies 
where management people do want to do right thing but don't have much room." 
 
Another NGO representative emphasised that although the ETAG initiative emerged out of "old-
fashioned solidarity work," it is important to recognise the realities of campaigning. "You 
eventually have to talk to the organization or company you're campaigning against because you 
have to have demands to make gains. (The other side will) say 'what do you want?'" 
 
Still another NGO representative took an historical perspective on engagement, situating 
positive social changes that have come about as a result of broad-based pressures. At some 
point it is critical to have some corporate support. "That goes back to the establishment of the 
welfare state," said this informant, adding that there was business support for policy milestones 
like Medicare. "You have to keep working on some allies within the corporate sector or else 
you're up against a brick wall." Compromises are key to any negotiations and that it is be 
unrealistic to assume that companies would be able to change conditions overnight. "Our 
approach has not been to aim for a pass/fail… At this point all their factories would fail." 
 
On this score, a business representative suggested that the problem from the start was that the 
process had too many similarities to traditional labour negotiations. "That preordains a win/lose" 
situation that this informant said the business side was not looking for. "We wanted to work 
together," and, finding common ground  "mark it, and move on." This more co-operative 
approach would be much better than labour-style bargaining that  "imputes that one side is 
better than the other. It shouldn't be that way." 
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2.1 Who's at the table? 
 
Each side expressed clear frustration over the perception that they were talking to the wrong 
people. 
 
The NGOs felt that they could have made more progress if they had been dealing directly with 
major companies as opposed to industry associations. "The associations are death as far as I 
am concerned," said one activist. "We never wanted to deal only with the associations. It just 
happened that way." This respondent felt that companies could use their umbrella groups as 
shock absorbers to insulate them from outside pressure, that it would be preferable to deal 
directly with major companies. A government observer of the process agreed that one of the 
reasons why the talks did not bear fruit was that "they were dealing with an association, not 
individual companies." 
 
Another NGO person hoped that, given the failure of the parties to reach an agreement on a 
base code of conduct, the groups advocating the code would in the not-too-distant future be 
able to get several of the big retailers "to differentiate themselves from the Wal-Marts of the 
world." 
 
And it seemed important from this perspective to make sure that the right business people are 
involved in the process. One respondent felt that the companies could learn something through 
engagement. They can accept the principles proposed by NGOs, if only for "pragmatic 
reasons." But again, it is insufficient to engage just with public relations of industry association 
people. Such an approach can easily lead to being so "buried in corporate culture" that "you 
never come out again" and "become so compromised you're not recognisable." 
 
From the company perspective, one participant stated flatly that the wrong people were there 
representing both NGOs and business. This person felt that the process started off in a very 
positive way but got bogged down because the people at the table had a vested interest in 
prolonging the process. Although careful to emphasise that they were "well-intentioned" and 
"had their hearts and souls in it," the participants simply didn't have the clout to cut a deal. 
Instead of "hands-on" heads of unions and the CEOs of retailers, those involved (employees of 
industry associations, NGOs and unions) "are gainfully employed" by the process and therefore 
have a material interest in dragging things out. 
 
Another private sector participant was frustrated by the unity on the other side of the table, 
particularly with respect to religious and labour positions. The NGOs "and particularly the 
churches should be working to their own agenda and not the agenda of labour. It became clear 
the two were not separate." This participant had assumed that church groups would be playing 
a facilitation role. While recognising that freedom of association was a legitimate labour issue, "I 
didn't see that as being the agenda of church groups." From this perspective, the churches were 
"irresponsible" for associating themselves with "derisive, inflammatory and misleading" 
statements by labour leaders. 
 
On this score, an NGO person chuckled that it must be "very confusing to industry" to encounter 
the interlocking personal and institutional connections that existed within the church/NGO/labour 
coalition. Indeed, the coalition was successful in maintaining its unity and coherence throughout 
the process. Another acknowledged that the coalition was comprised in part made of people 
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who had been working together for many years. And another (from a church background) 
indicated that the coalition shared a joint analysis, agreeing that anything that frees up the ability 
of unions to operate within a country is also going to lead to better working conditions. "That's 
really the main force for improving things – the workers themselves in those countries." 
 
 
2.2 Early Days 
 
Most participants agreed that the process of engagement between NGOs and the private sector 
on this issue is still at an early stage. Emphasising the need for a longer view, an NGO 
representative recalled the many years that Canadians concerned about the crushing level of 
Third World debt had been working on that issue before succeeding in getting the multilateral 
powers-that-are to budge on the issue. "We're still at an early stage on this." 
 
A business representative and self-described "pragmatist" declared that if you really want to 
accomplish something  "you take your best shot at a first go and get people involved and 
working with it." Once this process gets started, slowly but surely people start to modify their 
positions and improvement results. Then, within a relatively short period of a few years "you'd 
have a pretty good program." But, he added, "If you keep saying 'it's all or nothing right now, 
sign here'," then you will lose the retailers who simply will not be willing or able to go that far that 
fast. Another company person added, in more general terms, that "Dialogue is a good thing and 
should always be ongoing." 
 
A government observer stated that it had been "a rich learning experience" for both sides to get 
to know the other and to understand where the issues are coming from, adding that the process 
had also been instructive on shedding light on factors peculiar to the Canadian situation and in 
particular the nature – and rapidly shifting landscape – of the retail sector and manufacturing 
sectors in this country. 
 
Another businessperson stated that, now that the negotiations have ended, the company side 
would certainly be willing to work with "those NGOs who are prepared to work with us." This 
suggests that, like the NGO person who felt it was important to differentiate the more 
accommodating retailers from "the Wal-Marts of the world," the business side recognises that it 
would be tactically savvy to deal with separate organizations rather than a common front. This 
business representative said that it might be useful to work with "some NGOs in those 
countries" where child labour is an issue, citing India and Bangladesh in particular. And using 
standard NGO vocabulary, this informant felt that it was time for business to conduct some pilot 
projects "on the ground." (The Canadian NGOs involved in the ETAG process is unlikely to be 
persuaded that such initiatives, confined to the issue of child labour, would be sufficient to 
satisfy their concerns over the issue of freedom of association.) 
 
From the government side came the observation that the end of negotiations in the spring of 
2000 was not "the end of the world." The issue was out there before ETAG took shape and will 
certainly not evaporate overnight. "It's a process we're dealing with....patience is required."  
 
A Southern observer of the Canadian code-making process agreed that a go-slow attitude is 
appropriate. "We can wait. We do not have to be dictated by the agenda and pace of company 
initiatives." A Canadian NGO representative concurred. "There has to be a slower kind of 
process to figure out how it can be done in a way that involves Southern organizations." 
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Another government observer who agreed that it was still early days  ("It's in suspension, not 
dead.") returned to the composition of the negotiating organizations in explaining the slowness 
of the ETAG process: "When you're dealing with alliances, they have to get back to their 
people." 
 
Finally, a veteran of numerous NGO efforts at engagement with the private sector noted that the 
question of the length of the process shed interesting light on the different perspectives of 
NGOs and business. For the former, "codes are simply an organizing tool" while corporations 
are more likely to look at them as an institutions that remain in place, insulating them from 
popular pressure. Industry "may be rightly suspicious that things aren't going to stand still." 
 
 
2.3 Flexible Responses 
 
There was no mention of partnership from the informants. Rather, the business side 
emphasised dialogue while NGO participants talked of both dialogue and advocacy. The 
message from business was simple and clear. Dialogue can only be a Good Thing. Advocacy (a 
polite code word for straightforward opposition or, as one NGO participant described it in rather 
more succinct terms, as "rabble-rousing") is not something that the business side feels is 
necessary. Indeed, the description of critical public statements from the other side as "derisive, 
inflammatory and misleading" sums up this perspective. No one relishes being denounced. 
 
One participant echoed the NGO's side's general feeling about the need for tactical flexibility 
when engaging with corporations, a positive approach combined with a more critical one: "We're 
ready to play the negative card again." Having refrained from doing that while engaged in 
negotiations, this informant expressed the need to return to "more activist tactics." 
 
Another NGO representative stated simply that "You need both – people bashing their heads 
and people teaching them things." This informant added that the ETAG process had an ongoing 
campaigning element. When negotiations seemed to be languishing, there was a major letter-
writing campaign aimed at getting retailers directly involved in the talks. (Similarly, the threat of 
shareholder action – read, "advocacy" – had helped to persuade several retailers to back the 
proposed federal task force on sweatshop abuses.) There was campaigning when it was 
opportune. "You have to know when it's right to push hard and when it's right to be more 
conciliatory." 
 
With respect to the issue of the way engagement with the private sector fits in with neo-
liberalism and the broader trade and investment liberalisation agenda, an NGO participant 
pointed to "the key role" that corporate interests play in the current political and economic 
context. "We need to target that directly as well as government." This observer described the 
importance of two-pronged campaigns that involve people as both consumers and citizens. 
Consumers make their views known to businesses (in this particular case, retailers) and citizens 
pressure governments. 
 
"We've never been prepared to let governments off the hook," having always included 
government action in campaigning efforts. "I don't think ethical consumer stuff is going to do the 
trick by itself. Ultimately you do need government policy to make things mandatory." 
Nevertheless, consumer action can certainly be a very effective educational and mobilisation 
tool as well as being effective in garnering media attention. 
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While acknowledging that ETAG tried to alert people-as-consumers to the realities of sweatshop 
labour, another NGO person emphasised that when people are mobilised to take part in a 
campaign, however briefly, they tend to get involved not just as consumers. They act in other 
capacities, with other identities – perhaps as members of a parish, perhaps as students: 
"Sometimes we overplay the idea that it's just a consumer movement.  It's not really a consumer 
movement in terms of who is participating in it." 
 
As global production is outsourced, there is an emerging need to build momentum for 
international regulation. One NGO participant stressed the importance of building civil 
society/private sector consensus around standards that closely approximate International 
Labour Organization conventions. If such a consensus emerges, then "shouldn't the 
government be willing to promote that within trade agreements?" The difficulty, of course, lies in 
getting the private sector to come to such consensus in the first place. The growing resistance 
adds another layer of complexity to the neo-liberal project and its lead institutions. "There are 
lots of differences between groups that want to just abolish the World Bank, the IMF and the 
WTO and groups that want to push for changes in their nature. The choice isn't the WTO or 
nothing. There are other international institutions." 
 
For such an international strategy to be effective and accountable, ongoing communication is a 
prerequisite. Canadian NGOs seemed confident that the ETAG process recognised the need for 
consultation with Southern organizations. As one respondent put it: "Who are you negotiating on 
behalf of and how are you accountable to them? Everybody has to deal with that question." 
 
A Southern counterpart agreed that serious problems always arise, particularly in the area of 
international codes and code verification, when the agenda is "Northern-driven without proper 
consultation with Southern partners." In the case of ETAG, the consultation had been "quite 
OK." Careful cultivation of North-South links had contributed to positive international 
connections, especially when compared to the way similar processes had unfolded in the United 
States. "This is a very important step to have taken despite the fact that the process looks 
slower than other initiatives, especially the company-driven ones." 
 
A Canadian NGO representative added that US groups had sometimes framed the code of 
conduct issue in a way that Southern organizations (and governments) see as protectionist. The 
Canadian approach had been "quite different, both in the level of consultation and in the way 
we've framed our demands to take account of Southern concerns." Southern partners have 
generally "felt much better about the Canadian approach." But the same observer cautioned 
that, despite "very good back and forth on this one," consultation and information sharing must 
be ongoing. And not just for the sake of accountability: "We need to work on issues where there 
is some research capacity in other organizations. We can't do it all ourselves." 
 
"We learned with our failures and problems with European and American partners," observed a 
Southern informant who described tensions over Northern protectionism between NGOs and 
unions in the EEC and the USA. The Canadian NGOs and unions would appear to have 
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2.4 A role for government? 
 
Both the business and the NGO sides of the ETAG process expressed clear disappointment in 
the level of government support for their efforts. Given that NGOs had initially campaigned for a 
wide-ranging government task force initiative, they assumed that the modest compromise of 
government-mediated talks would be accompanied by a measure of public support that would 
help the process along. 
 
One NGO participant reported that, since the coalition on that side of the table was aware of 
disunity among the parties in the American code process, its members carried out a lot of 
internal consultation to learn about each other's perspectives, thus avoiding schisms. They did 
not put as much energy into familiarising business organizations with the issues involved, 
assuming that there would be enough support from the government for this to occur. Citing the 
U.K. government's investment of half a million pounds in a similar process, "We thought that the 
government would take some initiative in creating forums for business to talk to other 
businesses involved in similar processes in other countries." 
 
This did not happen. Describing government support for the process as "minimal," an NGO 
participant said that Ottawa should have taken a stronger role.  "Their ability or willingness to 
engage with business and push them on things like core labour rights was probably non-
existent." 
 
From the business side, one participant remarked that the government did not step in to help 
the process along very much. "They co-ordinated meetings but that was it." This informant felt 
that, in the wake of the end of the talks, "there will be more of a call for government to get 
involved and try to do something." 
 
Another business representative described the government's financial support of the process 
simply as "bupkes." (Uriel Weinreich's Yiddish-English/English-Yiddish defines bupkes as 
"beans," or, more precisely, a diminutive for that legume...) From this perspective, people had 
little familiarity with different codes and who was using them, who wasn't and why not. There 
needed to be a far better understanding of the meaning of all the different code initiatives being 
discussed internationally. "You throw everyone into a room. They have very limited resources." 
 
Lack of resources was cited by a government informant as one of the constraints on Ottawa's 
participation. The government is committed to "promotion, facilitation and advice... to the extent 
we have money, energy and resources." Another government observer of the process felt that 
Ottawa would now pay more attention to the area of corporate social responsibility, having 
previously opted for allowing the push to come from "a voluntary direction." Moreover, the 
government side makes much of external pressure building in the form of new OECD 
guidelines, and the emphasis on freedom of association and collective bargaining in the United 
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3.0  Conclusion 
 
Chinua Achebe called his classic 1958 novel, "Things Fall Apart." The story shows how 
colonialism has no respect for the pre-colonial, pre-modern order. The Nigerian novelist took his 
title from Yeats: 
 
Things fall apart; the centre cannot hold mere anarchy is loosed upon the world. 
 
Social relations and productive processes are constantly transformed. All that is 
solid, as another famous writer put it, "melts into air." 
 
Much has changed since the 1960s when most of the NGO activists in the ETAG process may 
have read Achebe's book. But the sense of things falling apart remains, with time and space 
collapsing even more dramatically. Capitalism has as little respect for its own past as it does for 
that of indigenous societies. We now have a regime of flexible accumulation, with virtual 
companies focusing on image and brand production rather than on shoe or shirt or even 
automobile manufacture. 
 
The process of flexible accumulation has been reproduced across economic sectors. The 
workers of south China's free trade zones or Mexico's maquiladoras are not paid by Daimler-
Chrysler (the decentralisation of production has not hindered the further centralisation of capital) 
or Sanyo or Nike. Geographer David Harvey asks if flexible accumulation is anything more than 
"a jazzed-up version of the same old story of capitalism as usual." He argues that this is a 
historical and simplistic, ignoring Marx's insight that capitalism is a dynamic, revolutionary force. 
Changes in the nature and locale of production have been accompanied by changes in the 
"conditions of consciousness formation and political action." 
 
This now-familiar story clearly has implications for those backing an agenda to end poverty, who 
are part of the movement opposed to negotiations over trade agreements that enshrine 
corporate rights while shuffling aside human rights – including the right to organize. Political 
actions aimed at supporting the global working class are changing, with consumer-based 
actions focused on corporate sourcing strategies gaining significance. 
 
The NGO participants in the ETAG coalition seem to have no illusions about consumer-based 
action and engagement with business being sufficient, by themselves, to tackle the huge task of 
ending global poverty. (Indeed, it seems to this writer that merely posing this question presents 
challenges of scope and complexity too mind-boggling to contemplate.) That said, these are 
people with years of experience both North and South. Their work on this issue shows that they 
regard engagement with business and the accompanying as a necessary part of a broader 
movement to improve the lives of working people. Their strategy might be described as "flexible 
action" confronting "flexible accumulation." 
 
Emerging as much from concern over Canadian sweatshops as those in the South, the ETAG 
NGOs (most of which are not traditional overseas development organizations) would not regard 
efforts to improve conditions at home as separate from their advocacy and dialogue work on 
codes of conduct for Southern sourcing. Capital is international and so are efforts to make it 
accountable. Against this background, the Canadian NGOs have been ultra-conscious of the  
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need to maintain solidarity among one another as well as with the organizations they identify as 
their Southern allies. They spend a lot of time and energy on successful process, 
communication, and accountability. 
 
That said, ETAG is a Canadian initiative. As such, its efforts around corporate accountability in 
the retail sector and with respect to corporate cultural icons like super brands suffer from 
limitations imposed by the dependent nature of the Canadian economy and changes in global 
capitalism. Nike is not only not Canadian company. Indeed, its American managers have 
contrived its swoosh as a global symbol. Any Canadian advocacy or dialogue with this sort of 
firm would be of very limited effectiveness unless it was part of a co-ordinated international 
campaign. In fact, Canadian NGOs have been active in such campaigns. 
 
During the ETAG process, one major player in Canadian retailing (Eaton's) crashed and another 
(Dylex) was teetering seriously. Eaton's was symbolic both of two things: incompetent 
management and the changing structure of Canadian retailing. The commanding heights of the 
sector are now overwhelmingly American-controlled (any claim by The Bay to Canadian control 
is uncertain). The most intransigent company (Wal-Mart) is a relatively recent arrival but has 
quickly gained some 40% of department store market. This offers NGOs both challenge and 
opportunity. It would seem highly unlikely that the Wal-Marts of the world will ever respond to 
pressure (advocacy, dialogue, whatever) from Canada alone. Whether the Retail Council will 
comply with NGO requests for a code that satisfies concerns over freedom of association is 
similarly unlikely, though NGOs still hope to be able to make progress with other major retailers. 
Developing co-ordinated campaigns with American organizations that share their concerns 
would seem to be the only way to deal with the Wal-Marts of the world. And international action 
– particularly in the world's biggest markets – remains an effective way to concentrate the 
attentions of the Nikes and the GAPs of the world. Such action has apparently been used 
effectively in the past. 
 
Which brings up the issue of what the Learning Circle heard about a "credible threat." Despite 
some NGO misgivings about this not sounding very positive, the fact remains that major firms 
are unlikely to change their ways unless they are convinced that they can be hurt if they fail to 
do so. Labour negotiators know that a strong strike mandate or high prices in the newsprint 
market combined with low industry inventories are more likely to yield a decent contract than 
lukewarm support from a membership that's aware of high inventories and low prices. Despite 
some business misgivings about the ETAG negotiations seeming too much like labour-
management bargaining, the fact remains that the NGO side had little in the way of a credible 
threat to force the other side to agree to one of its key demands. As the NGOs acknowledged in 
the wake of the end of the talks, Canadian companies "have not yet" been subjected to the 
same public pressures around sweatshop issues that European and US businesses have faced. 
So despite the leading role that ETAG NGOs played in setting the agenda for this effort to 
promote corporate accountability, they have yet to develop the clout needed for successful 
follow-through. None of the NGO respondents seemed surprised by this, seeing these efforts as 
simply part of a long-term process. 
 
(It is worth noting that MacMillan-Bloedel's agreement to alter logging practices only emerged 
after many years of protests and threats. Hundreds were arrested for civil disobedience at 
Clayoquot Sound and Greenpeace was able to use the images of clear-cut logging to threaten 
the firm with European consumer boycotts. The anti-sweatshop movement cannot yet deploy 
such an arsenal, though increased mobilisation young people and the steady growth of the 
movement against corporate globalisation in the wake of Seattle signal shifting political terrain.) 
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The coalition that took shape to engage business on the sweatshop issue was flexible enough 
to move from dialogue to advocacy as events unfolded. The transition between different modes 
of engagement was apparently smooth. This is important when confronting the protean power of 
global capital. At the same time, the coalition did not lose sight of the ultimate reality of social 
change. Although Marx was keenly aware of capitalism's revolutionary potential, he would not 
have disagreed with the statement that the main force for improving things in the South is "the 
workers themselves in those countries." Or, as one of ETAG's Southern counterparts asked, 
"Engagement for whom? By whom? Of whom?" 
 
Another issue that arises from this case study is the role of the Canadian government. Both 
NGO and business agree that the government could have played a much more active role in 
supporting the ETAG process. And though a government observer claimed that Ottawa was 
prepared to do what it could given the available money, energy and resources, it is fair to raise 
the issue of another commodity that seemed to be in limited supply in this case – inclination. If 
the government had had the political will, or if it had felt that ignoring petitions signed by 30,000 
Canadians supporting a task force would come with a political cost ("credible threat" revisited), a 
more stalwart response might well have been forthcoming. 
 
The Canadian government, however, has been supporting the code of conduct and corporate 
accountability initiatives in its peculiarly indirect and piecemeal way. Several of the ETAG 
groups receive CIDA funding, though not for this process. The International Centre for Human 
Rights and Democratic Development organized a seminar on codes and labels and the North-
South Institute conducted a roundtable on sweatshop issues. Both groups depend on 
government funding. And the International Development Research Centre funded the CCIC 
learning circle. At the same time (and despite some official optimism about government 
becoming keener on corporate accountability), proposed changes to the Canada Business 
Corporations Act do not address the problems faced by minority shareholders putting forward 
motions on social impacts of corporations. Indeed, they could make the situation worse. 
 
In the end, Canadian groups organizing in support of Southern workers will continue to push for 
corporate accountability, part of an international movement that combines hard-edged 
oppositional politics with experiments in new forms of social regulation. Meanwhile, capital will 
seek to further extend its control over workers, communities and markets in a movement guided 
by the principles of free trade and a self-regulating market. Whether social regulation can ever 
be effective without some sort of state regulation (perhaps in new, multilateral forms) is 
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Placer Dome in Marinduque 






From 1968-1997 the Canadian mining company Placer Dome Inc. co-owned (39.9%) and 
operated two copper mines on the island of Marinduque in the Philippines. During the operation 
of the Marcopper Mines, waste in the form of tailings and leakage from the waste rock silation 
ponds and waste dumps severely altered the ecosystems of the island’s two major rivers (Boac 
and Mogpog) and one large bay (Calancan).  On March 24, 1996, a massive tailings spill 
destroyed all life in the 26- kilometre long Boac River and damaged corals at the coastal mouth 
of the river.  
 
A UN investigation found that poor environmental management by mine officials was the cause 
of the spill. During this investigation the UN team also found a leaking waste rock siltation dam 
at the headwaters of the Boac River, which had been leaking for some time. The UN team 
identified this leak as the probable source of the river’s increasing acidification and metal 
contamination.  
 
Since 1992 periodic fishkills have occurred in the Mogpog river; a result of ongoing leaks of acid 
and metals from another siltation dam. After this dam burst in 1993, the river and nearby 
villages were flooded with toxic waste. Today mine waste flowing over the road leading to the 
dam effectively cuts off access to the dam. This waste is now funnelling through the dam’s 
overflow into the Mogpog River.  
 
In 1997, a year after the Boac river spill, Placer Dome divested its shares in Marcopper. Though 
Placer Dome denies responsibility for the Boac river spill, the company has agreed to clean up 
the river and compensate affected villagers. Four years after the spill, 20% of the tailings remain 
in a catchment area in the river, the rest have been washed to sea. 
 
Placer Dome has applied twice to Philippine authorities for permission to deposit the remaining 
tailings into the sea via Submarine Tailings Disposal, a practice considered illegal under current 
Canadian legislation. Both times permission has been denied and as such there has been no 
resolution to the tailings disposal issue. Negotiations continue with a view to breaking the 
deadlock involving Placer Dome, NGOs, the local community and the Philippine government. 
 
In the aftermath of the 1996 spill Placer Dome officials were quick to engage with Canadian 
NGOs. Before this Canadian NGO involvement in the issue was limited to voicing concerns over 
the social and environmental impact of Placer Dome’s operations in the Philippines by church 
and environmental groups in the form of shareholder resolutions. In the early 1990s, the 
dumping of the tailings ceased after the closing of one of the mines.  As a result NGO 
involvement in the issue fell off but there continued to be an engagement with Placer Dome on 
other fronts relating to corporate responsibility. In 1992, a new mine was opened but instead of 
dumping tailings into the sea (which the Philippine government no longer allowed) they were 
being dumped into an old mine pit. In 1996 it was the drainage tunnel from this pit that blew 
open and caused the massive tailings spill.  
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After the 1996 spill, a number of other Canadian NGOs became involved. Initiated by Placer 
Dome, several meetings were held with individuals and with groups of NGOs. Most of the 
Canadian NGOs were at first willing to meet with Placer Dome because they thought the 
company was serious about responding to the crisis relating to the spill. However, clear 
differences in goals and strategy soon emerged. These differences were rooted in the 
relationships that the Canadian NGOs had with their Philippine NGO counterparts as well as the 
community groups in Marinduque. The key difference lay in the importance placed on the pre-
1996 spill history of the problems relating to Calancan Bay and Mogpog River. The local 
community in Marinduque, represented by the Social Action Commission (SAC) of the Catholic 
Church and Marinduque Council for Environmental Concerns (MACEC) were adamant that 
Placer Dome’s responsibility and liability include addressing all of the social and environmental 
problems relating to the history of Marcopper’s operations in Marinduque. Placer Dome’s 
interest was clearly to limit the extent of its responsibility to dealing only with the problems 
relating to the 1996 spill.  
 
The extent to which Canadian NGOs were willing to accept Placer Dome’s position over and 
against the position of the local community is indicative of the split that emerged in the 
engagement strategy of Canadian NGOs towards Placer Dome. A similar split occurred 
amongst a number of Philippine NGOs who became involved in the issue. The situation became 
even more complicated when Placer Dome offered to put funds in place for a sustainable 
development programme in Marinduque and to channel these funds through NGOs. This served 
to exacerbate the split amongst those groups willing to engage with Placer Dome in dealing with 
the aftermath of the spill only and those groups pushing for a more comprehensive response to 
the history of mining on the island as demanded by the local community. For its part, the local 
community felt that any funds should go directly to the affected groups and for the cleanup of 
the spill. It also placed those Philippine NGOs who were engaging Placer Dome in the position 
of being viewed as “co-opted.”  
 
 
2.0 VIEWS OF PARTICIPANTS 
 
2.1 Views of NGOs 
Ten interviews were conducted by phone over the period of May 16-June8, 2000.  Six 
were with representatives of Canadian NGOs and four with Philippines NGOs.  Each 
of the paragraphs below represents points of views of the NGOs interviewed.  
 
2.1.1 Type of Engagement/Strategy Used 
 
As the responses to the questions suggest Canadian and Philippine NGOs adopted very 
different strategies in their engagement with Placer Dome. This is rooted in the differences in 
the overall goals behind their engagement strategy. Some were restricted to getting Placer 
Dome to clean up the 1996 spill and to arrive at a level of compensation for the affected 
community. Others were clear that the entire mining legacy on the island had to be addressed. 
Another important goal was to build the capacity and to empower both the local community as 
well as Philippine NGOs to actively engage on mining issues by assisting them through 
information flow, South-South exchange etc. In this instance the strategy adopted was not to 
engage directly with Placer Dome at all. A recent shareholder action focused not on the 
Marinduque issue itself but on getting Placer Dome to agree to a wider set of principles for all of 
its operations. 
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That the actions that Placer Dome takes to mitigate its actions, the results of the spill or its 
practises, would take into consideration the desires and the views of the affected people, for 
example in terms of the cleanup. It was to get at the people’s thinking about this, or about 
sustainable development, or about compensation, and to input this into Placer Dome’s decision-
making. 
 
Our goal was bringing the voices of civil society if you want, the NGO, back to a Canadian forum 
and create some kind of pressure so that people would realise what the private sector is doing. 
We see ourselves as supporting communities, social movements on the ground, pressuring and 
equipping and strengthening efforts that are on the ground. 
 
We were going in with the stance on whose side we were on, the side of the communities. 
Coming in at the time that we did we wanted to find a way that we could turn it into something 
where the communities would benefit and really hold the company accountable for what they 
had done. From the sounds of it the company, at least the Canadian side, seemed to want to do 
that. 
 
We had two goals: The first was that we wanted to go to court with our shareholder proposal 
and win the court case so that there would be a positive decision giving the active shareholder 
groups a favourable legal position to work from. Our second goal was to gain support amongst 
shareholders so that Placer Dome would agree to a roundtable on environmental issues which 
would include independent NGOs, unions, people from the affected communities etc. 
My NGO was set up in the fall of 1996, expressly to represent the views and requests of the 
three affected municipalities of Marinduque and to represent the messages they were sending 
to Canada about what they wanted Placer Dome to do after the spill in March 1996. I was 
bringing these to my engagements with the NGOs and with Placer Dome in Canada. I felt the 
need to set up this NGO of my own because Placer Dome had placed very clear limits on the 
company’s own responsibilities in Marinduque. They said they would only deal with the Boac 
cleanup. They would not deal with the legacy of ongoing mining-related problems. Most of the 
Canadian NGOs appeared willing to accept these limitations, at least temporarily. But I couldn’t 




Our goal in addressing the problem brought about by Placer Dome was to obtain justice for the 
Marinduquenos affected by the tailings spill by way of permanently closing the mines that have 
not been operated in a ecologically friendly way, and that Placer Dome pay a just and 
immediate compensation to those directly affected and that they rehabilitate the Boac river. 
 
Our strategy was capacity-building of communities, particularly in resource-management as part 
of their struggle for the legitimate right of these resources. That is basically the main strategy of 
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We would like to assume that Placer Dome is serious about its commitments. It was an 
opportunity to show that corporations like Placer Dome can undertake these kinds of initiatives 
and for them to own up to their responsibilities. 
Our engagement was directed at influencing corporate behaviour especially on social 
accountability and adopting a dialogic approach to developing a strategic plan for the long-term 
rehabilitation from the spill. 
 
 
❖ What did your NGO hope to achieve with the chosen strategy?  




If we reinforce and strengthen civil society that could exert pressure on government and 
government saw that these environmental measures ensured standards across the board for 
mining industries, this is the type of intervention that we saw as a way forward 
 
Our expectations changed…our objectives shifted as we got more involved, but…it seemed 
simple in the beginning but we were quick to see that our interlocutor from the company was not 
the company alone and he had to keep going back to get the approval of the company before 
moving forward. 
 
Our expectations did change. As a result of meetings with Placer Dome, we were invited to 
Placer Dome’s Roundtable on sustainability held in Sydney Australia at the end of March. At the 
meetings in Australia there was significant movement from Placer Dome. A senior VP of the 
company along with several NGOs worked out a “Draft Agreement” which committed Placer 
Dome to several key good faith benchmarks: on riverine disposal methods; not exploring or 
development in National Parks or protected areas; and proceeding only when the local 
community supports the mining activity. As a result of this rather historic “draft agreement” being 
developed we decided to withdraw our shareholder proposal. Placer Dome finally took the 
environmental NGOs seriously when it was clear that we have some influence in the Socially 
Responsible financial investment community, and that we could assist Placer Dome in being 
part of the Socially Responsible Index Funds once again. Socially responsible investing is a $3 
trillion business in the US now; and several billion in Canada. (In this quote “we” is used to refer 




Our strategy was to first engage in broad-based consultations with the communities, and we 
made the people realise that we had to speak with one voice, and act together if we wanted to 
have a forceful and effective action to address these problems. From that consultation emerged 
our NGO, a multi-sectoral group that seeks to address not only the tailing spill but all of the 
problems that have been brought about by mining operations in Marinduque. 
 
Whereas before communities were complacent now they are more assertive so this changes 
the nature of our engagement. We saw our strategy as very effective so we didn’t really change 
our strategy. We got into an assessment of our NGO’s engagement in the threatened 
communities and one of the recommendations was to provide wide-ranging support by directly 
engaging with the communities using these same strategies. 
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Placer Dome has insisted on hiring technicians and trying to persuade both the international and 
local community that the submarine tailings disposal method is the safest way. But I think the 
main factor for their decision is that it’s the cheapest way and they also want a precedent for 
other mining activities. The communities have consistently resisted that idea, of submarine 
tailings disposal. And every meeting we brought this issue to Placer Dome we were always met 
with technical people, explaining to you that it’s the safest way. 
 
Here you had this big spill and the company ready to do something, at least Placer Dome, and 
yet nobody on the ground was co-ordinating anything, and by that point the church refused to 
have anything to do with Placer Dome. They just sat back and a few of us were quite 
disappointed. My expectation was that they perhaps could have taken what the company was 
offering, and to demand more. The strategy of the church was to not engage at all so they had 
rallies, and they didn’t want to talk to any of the company people. The NGOs, on the other hand 
were more open to pushing the envelope a bit more and trying to facilitate things further. 
 
My initial engagement both with Canadian NGOs and with Placer Dome fell off sharply when I 
set up my NGO. I felt that neither the company nor the NGOs I was talking to at that point were 
going to broaden their scope. I started seeking other ways to put pressure on the company. I 
started having meetings with other NGOs that weren’t involved in that initial engagement, I 
started a web page, I started writing for Canadian newspapers and Philippine newspapers, I 
started attending Placer Dome’s GMs.  
 
I know there was some suspicion about the NGOs wanting something out of it, money say. The 
talk was that the NGOs were looking for additional support, operational money, and these 
NGOs had been working there for along time. That was a struggle that was unfounded and 




We no longer engage with Placer Dome people because we saw that they were not really 
sincere in their efforts and in the realisation of their accountability and responsibility to the 
people. With their divestment they believe they no longer have any legal or moral responsibility 
for Marinduque. 
 
We had tensions when it came to defining the means of cleanup. My institution’s position was 
that we disagreed that tailings could be dumped into the sea. Sometimes we had confrontational 
moments. At that point they (Placer Dome) isolated us, not the foreigners but their Philippine 
counterparts. They hired expats believing that expats are “better” than Filipinos. It was difficult 
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2.1.2 Complex Relations of Accountability and Ownership of Strategy  
 
The reasons behind the differences in goals and strategies become evident when responding to 
the issues of accountability and points of leverage. Because the various actors saw themselves 
as accountable to different groups this resulted in different approaches on how to exercise 
leverage on Placer Dome. For its part, Placer Dome’s goal has been fairly clear from the outset:  
to limit damage to its reputation in the wake of the spill and to limit its responsibility to 
responding to the spill only. These goals set the terms for its engagement strategy with both 
Canadian and Philippine NGOs. The extent to which the Canadian and Philippine NGOs 









A group of NGOs determined the strategy to engage with Placer Dome. It was a national effort 
with our Philippine NGO counterpart. I wouldn’t move unless they said yes. 
 
The strategy came directly from what the church was asking for. They had total input, in terms 
of defining the goals. Their input was total in terms of what they were asking for. I decided what 




Placer Dome approached us but we did not want to compromise the position of the communities 
as regards their position on the issue. We recommended Placer Dome get in touch with the 









If we took a course of action it was always discussed with our board. When Placer Dome would 
request a meeting, it was always presented through the board. I always made a point to inform 
the community in the Philippines that I was going to meet, and determine what were the 
outstanding issues for them, what they wanted us to bring to the table, and also reporting to 
them. So the information gathered about what Placer Dome said, for example about 
compensation, was always fed back to the community. 
 
It became far more complicated after the spill. A number of development NGOs saw an 
opportunity to bring big bucks toward their organisation when they knew that Placer Dome as a 
deep-pocket company was going to have to be putting up some monies for redevelopment. I 
was very sceptical about reporting directly what we were learning to NGOs that hadn’t clearly 
defined themselves, or clarified their role with companies. 
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We ensured accountability in two ways. One is that whatever we were doing in terms of initiative 
was also in conjunction with our partners. The other one was to consult other NGOs in Canada, 
the more people we can get, the more momentum of synergy we can gather, the better. Our 
colleagues in the South are people with whom we’ve been having long-term relationships. We 
work on long-term relationships. We act together to change something, and that is where we 




By being close by to the communities, we ensured accountability. They are part of the whole 




2.1.3 Synergy of Strategies and Point of Leverage 
 
What is most striking in the responses to these questions was the lack of a clear overall 
assessment of the various strategies being employed by the various actors. Only one NGO (a 
Philippine one) actually undertook a mapping assessment of all of the actors and interests. This 
resulted in the lack of a co-ordinated strategy in dealing with Placer Dome by NGOs to the point 
of acting at cross-purposes and in conflict with one another at times. 
 
 
❖ Before engaging with Placer Dome, did your NGO make an assessment of the 
potential complementarily or conflict with existing strategies implemented by other 




When Placer Dome said that it wanted to put together a consortium of Canadian and Philippine 
NGOs, it started to work through a couple of the churches, it was there that people were not 
being terribly critical in what constituted a relationship with the company. What did it mean for 
an NGO to have a direct partnership with a Canadian corporation? 
 
The assessment of the groups involved was that we had to do something. How do we ensure 
that compensation and accountability takes place? And I think people were generally surprised 
at the seeming openness of the company we saw it was part of their cleaning up their name. 
 
We decided not to engage Placer Dome directly. Once you get into a relation with a company, 
who are you representing? What’s your accountability? If Placer Dome invites a series of NGOs, 
which they tried to do, and some NGOs, I think, went, they then say, ‘we consulted with civil 
society’ and this is the biggest trap. The NGOs and social movements have become stronger 
and are players in the political spectrum. They often get caught in this double accountability 
trap. It has to be clear who designs the agenda and who speaks for whom, and what is the 
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Before engaging with the Marcopper issue we had formed a committee to oversee the whole 
activity in Marinduque in terms of managing the mining campaign, so we discussed this with the 
different groups who composed the mining campaign committee. 
 
We conducted a mapping assessment of all of the actors involved on the island and outside to 
understand what were their key positions and interests. We understood that one of their (Placer 
Dome’s) interests was to clean up their mess and to be responsible. So we saw a common 
ground of interest. 
 
 
❖ Was there a need for some trade-off and compromises in pursuing this case of 




To Placer Dome’s credit, it tried as much as possible, by using NGOs to try to bring the 
community to its side. But what it did NOT try to do was to really listen seriously to what the 
communities were saying. Now, Placer Dome had decided on the submarine tailings disposal 
method. The communities absolutely rejected it. So Placer Dome’s interest is not in terms of 
responding to what the community requests…but what it wants to do and it tries to use NGOs to 
try and bring the communities on their side. 
Playing the role of conflict negotiating required compromises which were not necessarily for me 
to make. I think people were having a hard time making those compromises and that’s why 




We still go on with this dialogue, they still have staff on the island, they frequently come to our 
offices, they give us documents. We still talk. We are on good terms because we understand 
that we have to settle this. It’s just a matter of the right timing and the style of negotiating. We 
give them critiques, we recommend, we appreciate them if they are doing good…The non-
confrontational approach is still working, even though we confront once in a while. We try to 
keep our balance in the negotiations as long as we keep track on the fundamentals on which we 
do not compromise. 
 
 
2.1.4 Impact Assessment and Monitoring 
 
Most of the respondents did not feel the situation had improved, as the cleanup had not yet 
been implemented. A number did cite the empowerment of the local community and the 
strengthened capacity of Philippine NGOs to deal not only with Placer Dome but engage on the 
issue of mining in general. Most have learned important lessons from their engagement with 
Placer Dome especially about the need to be clear about what their goals are. For Philippine 
NGOs the abiding concern is that of appearing to be co-opted and of losing the trust of the 
communities they are supposed to be representing. 
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❖ What has changed for the community/people the NGO wanted to serve?  
Who benefited most from the NGO-business engagement – the Northern NGOs, 




I think there is a sense of the strength. Not change, but the strength they have as a community, 
even if they don’t get any result. The fact that they have been able to carry on this struggle with 
Placer Dome. 
 
I think big strides have been made. But more has to be done. I think the communities have 
learned a very clear lesson about mining and the need to get involved in the beginning. 
Secondly, they have been able to get a minimum of compensation and for example the social 
development plans have taken off. They have also been able to get some training in…market 
enterprise, as well as…mutual gains approach to conflict resolution. So there has been some 
capacity-building. On the negative side you still have a church that refuses to move. On the 
positive [side] the mine is closed. But at the same time the economy is stagnant. You have the 
implications of a stopped mine, with holes that are filling, and other ecological problems that 
Marcopper won’t pay for…it’s another bomb waiting to explode. 
 
I would argue that we were instrumental in gaining a measure of rehabilitation in Calancan Bay. 
Related to that objective was getting Placer Dome to carry out independent environmental 
audits, of all of its sites both domestically and internationally. Placer Dome today does that 
routinely. 
It has strengthened communities and actors within the community, that were not as strong 
before. It has also exposed the power relations in communities. Some people live very well in 
Marinduque and some people benefit from Placer Dome’s presence. As long as you have only 
one local dominant player and there’s no one who presents something different, it becomes very 
difficult for people to react and say, yes, there’s another path. 
 
For the first time Placer Dome was up against a coalition of environmental NGOs and a private 
company – involved in SRI – which has some influence in Placer Dome’s long-term share price. 
Corporations are not willing to change at all unless they can see a tangible financial reason to 
do so. They aren’t interested because it’s the “right thing to do.” 
 
In the beginning, Placer Dome benefited from the engagements with NGOs a lot. I wouldn’t say 
the northern NGOs benefited from it because it didn’t go anywhere. The southern NGOs and the 
community in Marinduque certainly didn’t benefit. The local church-based organisation was 
completely isolated in that process and it was horrible — they were being called unreasonable 
by Placer Dome. Because the NGOs were willing to accept the limitations that Placer Dome put 
on its responsibilities in Marinduque, they lost the ability to push the company at a time when 
the company was weakest. In those first six months after the spill, when the company was really 
weak, if we could have been united in pushing for what Marinduquenos were asking for, we 
might have made a real difference. 
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In terms of benefits, I cannot quantify it, but I think the community has benefited more. Placer 
Dome’s image became negative in terms of public opinion. It is the community, then, who is 
advantaged compared to Marcopper. Economic benefits? I don’t think the community has 





Are the impacts positive or negative for poverty reduction?  
At what level – small community, national level (regulatory) or international – were the 




There have not been [positive impacts], people lost their jobs, people lost livelihoods. I would 
not say that there has been an improvement in their lives, and also the fact that there’s still the 
constant threat of, for example, tailings containment. On the other hand, I feel that the 
community feels that as long as the mine is closed they benefit. 
 
What has really happened in the four years that I’ve been doing this, is the community in 
Marinduque has just become unbelievably strengthened in its resolve. The amount of support 
the church and the other local NGOs now has is very broad in Marinduque. It’s not just that the 




Marcopper/Placer Dome now realise that they cannot just run away from their responsibilities 
because the people have become aware that they are to blame for what they have suffered for 
a long, long time and that they must answer for what they have done. Some people have been 
given compensation. People are also aware that the Boac River must be rehabilitated, not in the 
way Placer Dome wants, by disposing the tailings into the sea. Many people have become 
aware of the problem and they have come to realise that this method should not be allowed 
because it will bring environmental degradation to our sea. 
 
 
To what extent has the NGO engagement with the Placer Dome allowed it to 




The company went from an outright refusal that it had anything in the way of a responsibility to 
that local community, an outright refusal, to in 1996 at least beginning to say that it had some 
measure of responsibility for lost livelihood. I think the company has learned that it is to its own 
detriment if it doesn’t learn to take seriously concerns that are raised by the local community, 
particularly over the social and environmental impacts of its operations. I think it has also 
learned that it has to take steps to meet NGOs part way, in learning a language to speak about 
its social and environmental impacts. 
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This is the third year in a row they’ve been questioned about Marinduque. I don’t think they like 
it, I think one of the signs that it has backfired is that they are not as friendly as they used to be. 
Is this going to be benefiting Placer Dome over time? A lot of it will depend on the degree to 
which NGOs want to keep an ethical position in front of Placer Dome. 
 
I think Placer Dome has learned from the experience. I think they’ve learned more about NGOs. 
And they have since participated in CIDA roundtable presentations on NGO-corporate 
engagement and they’ve done other stuff internally, actually talking about the Marcopper 
experience. 
 
Placer Dome has really pushed this working-together-with-NGOs track. I would say Placer 
Dome has learned lessons through this. They were able to convince top management to adopt 
what they learned by reaching out to the major NGOs that might have been very critical, the 
ones who had been critical in the 1980s, and essentially neutralise them directly after the spill. 
They realised that if they could get NGOs to work with them then it would dampen the level of 
criticism that they might have otherwise had. I think that’s really become part of the corporate 
strategy, just having the sustainability policy gives them an edge. Being able to say that they 





Did the changes achieved during the engagement justify the efforts, the costs, the 




I wondered at times if our effort was worth it. The polarisation and the emotions…there were 
times that I felt that I wanted to drop everything. When you get linked with a company like that, 
even if it’s not true, you are questioned, and you really feel insulted…but in retrospect, on the 
whole I think it was worth it. I think the communities have been able to get some advances and 




Yes it has been a worthwhile engagement for us. Yes we have consolidated the community 
actions now. Even now the campaign is still ongoing particularly at the local level in Marinduque. 
 
 
To what extent did your direct or indirect involvement in this case change the 
understanding of your role as an NGO? 
 
Canadian NGOs  
 
These days, four years later, I’m not sure how appropriate it is for any NGO to be working in a 
direct contract relationship with a company on a development issue. 
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This engagement has strengthened our perception of the limits and the dilemma of social 
partnership. It has also made us a lot more aware of the sophistication of this kind of 
engagement, all the dilemmas and difficulty of defining a position with regards to the private 
sector. The discourse from the private sector has evolved, it’s a lot more sophisticated. The 
traps and the possibilities for some form of engagement that leads to some form of losing your 
 
own critical capacity, your critical edge as an NGO, is there. We have been forced to re-
examine our assumptions, make sure that we are clear on what we’re proposing, and willing to 
force a debate, to try to open the space and crack into this implicit consensus among NGOs that 
this is the way forward, the inevitability of engaging with the private sector. 
 
Key in our learnings has been that it’s important when you go into the negotiation that you’re 
clear what you’re doing there. So every time you are stuck, you’re able to go back to that and 
clarify what your role is and who you are representing. This crisis serves as a model of what not 
to do, of what can happen if standards aren’t kept. I think people are on guard more so, to 
develop and monitor these standards. You have a company that has an enormous amount of 
resources potentially, and a name that is mud. So how can you make use of that? By pushing 
them to be more accountable. The company seems to be bending. 
 
My understanding of what an NGO should do is firmly rooted in this experience. It’s not that an 
NGO should not engage with a company. But an NGO should be very firmly rooted in what local 
communities are experiencing and what their needs are. The NGO, meeting with the company, 
should be a vehicle conveying those needs and demands of the community, instead of starting 
by asking the company what it is willing to do. Too many of these NGOs go to the company and 
say, how far are you willing to go, and then they have internal discussions about whether this 
would at least get something for the local communities. And that’s completely wrong. If the local 
community wants the whole package and not a piece of it, then it’s not right for Canadian NGOs 




It taught us how to deal directly with a global interest, how to handle complicated negotiations. 
 
 
 2.2 VIEWS OF PLACER DOME 
 
Two Placer Dome officials were interviewed. One has primarily engaged with Canadian NGOs 




2.2.1 Types of Engagement /Strategy Used 
 
❖ Why and when did you decide to engage with the NGOs and affected communities?  
 
The real reason for getting the NGOs involved was because they had a significant network in 
that area. As for Placer and Marcopper, most of their efforts had been on the other side of the 
island. They didn’t have that built-in network. So the hope was that they could tap into this 
network of NGOs and get the information quickly into the communities. They also sought 
feedback from the communities as to what their concerns were. 
 
The Marcopper spill created a very serious situation for the corporation because of its 
association with Marcopper and the perception that Placer Dome was going to have to do 
something about this, although legally it was the responsibility of Marcopper. I realised that the 
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NGO network was going to be significantly stimulated by all of this and I needed to find some 




What were your objectives for this engagement?   
Do you believe they were achieved?  
What were the positive outcomes from your engagement with the NGO and/or the 
community? 
 
Our objectives were basically to develop a fairly broad-based support for our program of action 
with respect to cleaning up the river and compensating the affected communities. Now we were 
only concerned with the Boac spill, because it was a crisis that had occurred and many people 
were affected. Our objective was that the most affected parties were satisfied with the outcome. 
And that’s still our objective. We’ve gotten some satisfaction in some areas. The compensation 
payments have been slower than people would want. I think there’s been some satisfaction with 
the sustainable development program, but with everything that happens, there are always 
political auras around them, so even the electrification program is regarded as somehow a 
political payoff rather than a contribution to the improved socio-economic circumstances of 
those communities that never had electric power before. 
 
The initial objectives, of trying to use the NGO network to get info into the community, that was 
pretty successful. In terms of cleanup objectives no, not effective at all and the reason for that is 
we haven’t been able to come up with a public consensus on how to move the issue forward. 
And there has been enough public outcry, from a variety of sources, to stall the national 
government in their efforts to move it forward. There is a number of underlying agendas. One is 
that the Catholic Church, through their Social Action Committee, are very adamant that the mine 
will never start up. One of the ways from keeping the mine from starting up is to make sure that 
mine doesn’t get its operating certificate by ensuring that the river never officially gets cleaned 




2.2.2 Complex Relations of Accountability/Ownership   
 
What mechanisms did you use to ensure transparency in your relation with NGOs vis-
à-vis the community involved in the relation?  
 
The transparency itself has been difficult because there’s a lot of suspicion. A lot of business in 
the Philippines is done under the table so these are natural suspicions. Having said that we’ve 
tried to get around it by disseminating the information as much as possible in the large groups 
that are fairly diverse groups with representation from a number of different components. We 
have openly tried to make ourselves available to discuss these issues but haven’t been terribly 
successful because there isn’t the desire to engage in such discussion because of the 
polarisation. 
 
We really believed that we had to remain as transparent as possible. The public manner of 
communicating proved not to be the best, but we went to great lengths to make sure our 
messages were consistent, to all the people we were talking to. With respect to the 
communities, I think there was an effort to deal directly with them. 
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How did different stakeholders in the community perceive your business? 
 
In the context of the spill there have been two opposite opinions about Placer Dome. The larger, 
more international NGOs have a certain sympathy for the politics and the difficulties of working 
within a political 3rd world environment. They have expressed to me a certain sympathy with our 
position at Placer Dome. There have been some that have actually come out and said: look, in 
our opinion you guys have done more than we would expect a corporation to do given the 
specifics of the situation, although they are in the minority. From the other major NGOs: we 
think you’re doing the right thing and we applaud you. The smaller, more focussed NGOs seem 
to focus on the end result, so they are unhappy. They say, “we’re not at all on board.” 
 
 
2.2.3 Impact Assessment and Monitoring  
 
To what extent did your direct or indirect involvement in this case change the 
understanding of your role as a corporation?   
 
It catalysed a lot of discussion within the organisation. Placer has been an organisation that has 
felt the need to involve the community but this really raised the level of awareness of some of 
the negative sides of mining. It opened up some interesting debates about how effective we 
were in terms of communicating with the community at large, building relationships, and so 
forth. It certainly promoted a much greater awareness of some of the impacts that mining could 
have and the community’s thoughts on those issues. It also raised the question of are we really 
aware of our relationships with the community? So now there’s a lot more effort going into really 
solidifying those relationships. 
 
There grew an awareness that finding some sort of consensus with NGOs was a key to 
resolving the Marcopper issue, which alerted them generally to the role of civil-society 
organisations in corporate strategy and activities. Since then there’s been a high level of 
understanding in Placer Dome, of the need to communicate with NGOs. Ongoing high-level 
engagement with NGOs started in 1997. We’re also looking at NGO connections around new 
projects in the field and even some existing projects. It certainly has increased the corporate 
awareness that the sustainable development agenda that we’ve committed to can only really be 
achieved with some collaborative approach of working with NGOs. 
 
 
Who do you think has changed most in this relation: the NGO or Placer Dome?  
What kind of changes has taken place? 
 
I would say the corporation has moved the most. There has been a tremendous advance in 
thinking, in Placer Dome, as a result of the experiences that we’ve had, both coming out of the 
Philippines but also subsequently…The community has changed in terms of its capacity for 
communal action in its best interest, socio-economic progress in the aftermath of the spill. The 
NGOs have evolved somewhat in their thinking with respect to the possibilities of working with 
corporations. We have not had a formal partnership but we’ve had ongoing efforts to see if we 
could work together in certain instances. 
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There’s certainly been a large change within our organisation regarding understanding NGOs 
and the value of working with NGOs and trying to learn from all of the different perspectives on 
a particular issue. Having said that, most of the initiatives that the company has been involved 
in, are on a more global scale than working directly with smaller communities. Not to say that 
the individual mines don’t work very closely with their communities. But the corporate initiatives 





How do you see the role of the private sector in the community where they invest or 
source their products? Why?  
 
We recognise that we have to be an integral part of the communities and we have learned that 
those communities perhaps need to be larger in focus than what we have done in the past. We 
are of the opinion that there needs to be a flow of resources back to the community and into the 
province. But we’re hesitant to put ourselves in the position of dictating to the government to 
what degree that needs to be done. We’re somewhat reticent about getting involved in the 
details. 
 
Is there a place for primary resource companies to become a surrogate government? Where 
that shows up is in terms of infrastructure. What responsibility does a resource company have in 
terms of sustaining that infrastructure and making it so the community can sustain it? Is that the 
responsibility of the resource company to do that or is that the responsibility of government? It 
very quickly gets into an interesting debate. 
 
The old model of the relationship between corporation and community was quite paternalistic. 
Corporations would frequently build infrastructure. The new model is along the lines of 
sustainable development, trying to strengthen the capacity of communities to do things in their 




To what extent, is Placer Dome willing to change and become more in tune with the 
corporate social responsibility agenda?  
 
Our way of understanding the corporate social responsibility is primarily encased in our 
sustainable development strategy where I think we are dealing with the major issues: 
responsibility, overall accountability, and ethical decisions. I think the corporation is 





Some of the Canadian and Philippine NGOs have come away from this experience feeling they 
were used by Placer Dome as part of a public relations exercise in the critical period after the 
1996 spill. There is also some residual questioning of the motives of other groups who were 
regarded as too closely aligned with Placer Dome. These groups maintain that their strategy of 
engagement was always to ensure that Placer Dome respond to “do the right thing.” Others 
defend their decision not to engage directly with Placer Dome but instead work at strengthening  
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the capacity of the Philippine NGO counterparts. Finally, there is the recent experience of a 
shareholder action which is very clearly directed at Placer Dome’s bottom line:  Agree to a set of 
principles and we will consider listing Placer Dome in a Socially Responsible Index. 
 
The case study of Placer Dome in Marinduque and Canadian NGO involvement provides a 
number of important lessons for NGOs in Canada and the Philippines, the affected community 
as well as Placer Dome. These are best teased out by working through a series of questions on 
this issue which may provide a useful set of guidelines for future engagement with the private 
sector by NGOs. 
 
1) What were the factors that mitigated against Canadian NGOs having a coordinated strategy 
in their engagement with Placer Dome? Was it the response strategy adopted by Placer 
Dome? The different interests and self-understandings of the Canadian NGOs? The mixed 
messages of the various Philippine NGOs and communities? 
 
2) Did the Canadian NGOs do a thorough assessment of the advantages and disadvantages of 
engaging with Placer Dome on this issue?  
 
3) Did the actions of Canadian NGOs put their Philippine counterparts in a difficult position by 
having them viewed as being “co-opted” by Placer Dome by the affected community? To 
what extent did these actions soften opposition to Placer Dome in the critical period after the 
spill? 
 
4) How do the NGOs involved deal with the potential pitfall of becoming “tainted” when funds 
are being offered for ameliorative programmes? 
 
5) Do NGOs possess the requisite negotiating skills to engage effectively with the private 
sector? 
 
6)  Canadian NGOs played a variety of roles vis-à-vis Placer Dome, the affected community 
and Philippine NGOs. These included: 
 
a) Channelling information from Placer Dome to the affected community and Philippine 
NGOs 
b) Acting as a go-between and facilitator between Placer Dome, the affected community 
and Philippine NGOs, at times to soften opposition to Placer Dome. 
c) As a means for Placer Dome to test whether certain responses would fly with the 
community. 
d) Speaking on behalf of the affected communities to Placer Dome 
e) Assisting Philippine NGOs re: capacity-building and empowering them to respond 
directly to Placer Dome. 
f) Shareholder actions or the threat of shareholder action to push Placer Dome to agree to 
improve their practices. 
 
What are the potential benefits and pitfalls to each of these approaches?  
Which strategies are complementary and which are potentially in conflict with one another? 
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Fourteen interviews conducted by phone or in person over the period May 16 – June 8, 2000. 
Six were with representatives of Canadian NGOs, four with Philippine NGOs and two with 
Placer Dome officials. 
 
Catherine Coumans. “The Sore that Keeps Festering”. The Financial Post. April 8, 1997. 
 
Keith Damsell. “Island’s Deadly Legacy”. The Financial Post. May 8, 1999. 
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Questions for Guided Interviews 
 
The questions have been put in 4 groups, three of them focusing the three key areas for further 
research, and one on the type of engagement used and the underlining objectives of the 
engagement.  The set of questions below tries to cover the main concerns raised by participants 
during first workshop. The questions will need to be adapted according to the person 
interviewed.  In addition, under the heading “optional” we include some questions left to the 
discretion of the interviewer.  Through them, we would like to unveil some critical issues 
underlining the debate on NGO engagement with the private sector. 
 
 
Type of Engagement/Strategy Used 
 
What was the goal and the strategy was used to engage with the private sector?  Did it change 
as the events unfold?  What influenced the choice of that strategy/type of engagement? What 
did the NGO hope to achieve with the chosen strategy? And, did these expectations change 
during the implementation of the strategy? Was there discussion or consideration of alternative 
strategies?  What were the critical issues or moments in the relation (or campaign) with the 
private sector?  What were some of the difficult moments in this relationship with the private 
sector (or during the campaign)?  How the NGO or the coalition managed those risks?  
 
{Private Sector informants} Why and when did you decide to engage with the NGO?  What were 
your objectives for this engagement?  Do you believe they were achieved? What were the 
positives outcomes from your engagement with the NGO or/and the community?   
 
Has any third party played any role in the relation of NGO engagement with the private sector? 
What was this role? Why and at what time did this organization play a role?  What were the 
benefits of its participation?   
 
Do you believe the engagement with the private sector in the case you have participated in has 
contributed to an agenda to end poverty? To what extent and how? 
 
 
Complex Relations of Accountability and Ownership of Strategy  
 
Who determined the strategy to engage with the private sector, how and for whom? To what 
extent did organizations from the South have input in defining and deciding the type of 
engagement with the private sector and in selecting the terms under which it would take place?  
Who spoke for whom?  
 
What means did NGOs use to ensure accountability towards the a) the funding agency, b) the 
implementing coalitions c) North/South partners and/or affected communities and d) the wider 
  




NGO community (and/or third parties) throughout the life of the engagement with the private 
sector?  Did one line of accountability prevail over the others?  Why?   
 
{Private Sector informant} What mechanisms did you use –as private sector—to ensure 
transparency in your relation with NGOs vis-à-vis the community involved in the relation?  Who 
were your interlocutors—the community affected and/or other NGOs?   How did different 
stakeholders in the community perceived your business?  If there were activities for community 
development, by whom and how were they funded?  To what extent did the people affected play 
a role in the decision making?   
 
 
Synergy of Strategies and Point of Leverage 
 
Before engaging with the private sector in a specific way, did the interested NGOs make an 
assessment of the potential complementarily or conflict with existing strategies implemented by 
other NGOs/Civil Society organizations with regard to that company elsewhere? Or, with others 
projects or programs the same NGO is implementing elsewhere?  How do the objectives of this 
engagement fit with the NGO’s broader agenda and mission? Do these NGOs also address the 
broader trade and investment liberalisation agenda at the WTO or elsewhere? Was there a 
need for some trade-off and compromises in pursuing this case of private sector of 
engagement?  
 
Did the NGOs involved decide to change the nature of their engagement (i.e. from external 
advocacy to dialogue etc)? When and Why were these shifts made? How did the different 
members of the coalition and/or partners relate to changes in the original strategy? Was the 




Impact Assessment and Monitoring 
 
What has changed for the community/people the NGO wanted to serve? Who benefited most 
from the NGO-business engagement –the Northern NGOs, the business, the Southern NGOs, 
the community among others? Are the impacts positive or negative for poverty reduction? At 
what level – small community, national level (regulatory) or international – were the impacts 
perceived most clearly?  To what extent has the NGO engagement with the private sector 
allowed the targeted company to strengthen its corporate position globally?  Did the changes 
achieved during the engagement justify the efforts, the costs, the trade-offs and the 










To what extent did your direct or indirect involvement in this case has changed the 
understanding of your role as activist or corporation?  Who do you think has changed most in 
this relation: the NGO or the corporation? And, what kind of changes has taken place? 
 
How do you see the role of the private sector in the community where they invest or source their 
products?  Why?  To what extent, is the business/private sector willing to change and become 
more in tune with the corporate social responsibility agenda?  
  





The Canadian Council for International Co-operation is 
a coalition of over 100 Canadian non-profit organizations 
who seek to change the course of human development in 
ways that favour social and economic equity, democratic 
participation, environmental integrity and respect for 
human rights. CCIC conducts research, disseminates 
information and creates learning opportunities for its 
members, co-ordinates their collective efforts to shape new 
models for world development, presses for national and 
international policies that serve the global public interest, 




In 1998 the Canadian Council for International Co-
operation and its 100 member organizations launched in 
common, a Canada-wide campaign, to move global poverty 
from the margins of the Canadian public agenda to the very 
centre of that agenda. The campaign seeks to mobilise all 
Canadians in a single unstinting effort to end poverty.  The 
centrepiece of the campaign is a 10-point international 
policy agenda for global action against poverty. It analyses 
the forces that conspire to keep 1.3 billion people in 
conditions of extreme poverty, outlining concrete steps that 
individuals, corporations, organizations and the 
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